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Abstract 
There are a large number of investors and companies reliant upon analyst earnings 
forecasts. Missing analyst forecasts can have a massive impact on share price and 
investors often look to these values to make decisions regarding future investment 
decisions. However, there has been a great deal of speculation about these forecasts and 
especially the error associated with them. With the threat of an impending recession, it is 
important to know the reliability of forecasts during times leading up to recessions. More 
specifically, this study aims to see how the level of error associated with analyst earnings 
forecasts change leading up to recessions and whether or not they should be relied upon 
as heavily during these times. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In this study, I will look at the trends in the error of analysts’ earnings forecasts 
leading up to recessions to see if analysts are accurately incorporating declining 
economic activity into their forecasts. I chose to analyze the past three recessions from 
1990 until 2018. The driving idea behind this analysis is that outside factors have too 
much impact and therefore analysts do not accurately incorporate a potential recession 
into their forecasts. Therefore, there would be greater error in forecasts and this has 
implications on all of those who rely on the accuracy of these forecasted earnings values. 
I recently performed an in-depth analysis of a few components of the Leading 
Economic Indicator and thought about what other pieces of financial information the 
public assumes are “forward-looking” projections. This sparked the idea to look at the 
trends of analysts’ forecasts and the components of the error during economic decline. If 
analysts are truly forward-looking and have a more complete understanding of the 
macroeconomic climate as well as financial climates, than the error associated with 
analyst forecasts should be relatively stagnant leading up to recessions. In other words, 
analysts would be accurately pricing in declines due to slowed economic activity and 
therefore their error would not increase in size. However, due to many outside factors that 
have been previously researched, there is evidence to suggest that analysts would not be 
accurately pricing in economic downturns and therefore produce less accurate forecasts.   
 The main finding of this study was that the difference between analyst forecasts 
and actual values increased greatly before recessions. Further, the overall level of 
optimism bias did not decrease in the way we would expect it to if analysts were building 
in the declining economic climate into their forecasts. There are many indicators of 
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slowed economic growth that we would expect to see analysts take into consideration 
when calculating their forecasting bias. Even something as simple as quarterly growth in 
GDP we would expect to have been factored into these forecasts. 
This lack of a relationship between optimism bias and recessions opens up room 
for further discussion surrounding how to improve forecasts by incorporating this type of 
analysis. This would be very impactful for those who are reliant on the information put 
forth by analysts to be as accurate as possible. This also could have further implications 
on the company’s overall performance if the estimates are less accurate during this time 
as their stock price is very likely to be taking a large hit because of the company’s 
earnings are far below forecasted earnings.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
How well analyst forecasts end up matching actual earnings is a heavily 
researched topic, and almost all reports come to the same conclusion: analysts are 
upwardly biased. Therefore, there is a lot of speculation regarding the accuracy of 
analysts’ forecasts on a broad scale. A 1995 study entitled “A Theory of Analyst Forecast 
Bias” looked at the relationship of optimism bias and access to management information. 
These authors hypothesized that the level of optimism is due to the desire to appease 
managements to gain access to further information about the company. This study 
showed statistical evidence that initial forecasts put forth by analysts will consistently 
contain a relatively high level of optimism bias due to this reason. There is no indication 
that analysts have changed this behavior and there is still a lot of evidence that analysts 
have bias built in to all forecasts. (Krishnan and Sivaramakrishnan, 1995) 
2.1: Earnings and the Business Cycle 
Previous research has indicated that there is a positive correlation between actual 
firm earnings and earnings growth and the business cycle. The authors defined the 
business cycle as the rate of overall growth in the economy and the level of economic 
activity. (Johnson, 1999) The level of reaction depends on the specific industry, business 
model and other factors of the company itself. However, all firms see some level of 
interaction with overall economic activity when looking at actual earnings. This indicates 
that the forecasts of earnings should also be dependent on forecasts of overall economic 
activity to some extent. Analysts often, roughly, make changes in assumptions for base, 
bear and bull cases in terms of valuation and then weight these different scenarios in 
order to come up with one forecasted earning value for the firm. However, if analysts are 
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truly examining macroeconomic trends and attempting to build this into their valuations 
they would alter their forecasted earnings based on the status of the overall economy.  
2.2: External Influences on Forecasts    
Putting the previous two ideas together, “The Relation Between Analysts' 
Forecasts of Long‐Term Earnings Growth and Stock Price Performance Following Equity 
Offerings”. The authors found that not only were analyst forecasts upwardly biased and 
overestimated long-run earnings upon equity offerings, but also that there was a positive 
correlation between fees paid to analysts’ employers and level of the same employers 
analyst forecasts. (DeChow, Hutton and Sloan, 2010) This may indicate that analysts will 
not be accurately looking at macroeconomic trends and building them into the valuations. 
Further, the authors of “Do Managers Always Know Better? The Relative 
Accuracy of Management and Analyst Forecasts” looked into the difference between 
manager and analyst forecasts. While the outcome does not specifically apply to this 
paper, the authors discussed the difference in building analyst and manager forecasts. The 
authors hypothesized that analysts would have much more macroeconomic data built in 
to their forecasts, but they failed to find evidence for this. (Hutton and Shu, 2012). All of 
the literature regarding analyst forecasts generally imply that analysts are not accurately 
building in macroeconomic trends because they are too reluctant to lower their forecasted 
values due to outside factors. However, there has been no literature directly addressing if 
this theory holds leading up to recessions. 
Previous research also shows that analysts are typically very hesitant to lower 
their forecasts and be pessimistic. This is usually due to the overlap of clients within the 
firms that produce these forecasts. It is very unlikely for analysts to want to release any 
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negative news for the fear of losing clients. (Nathan, 2010) Further, analysts’ forecasts 
are often used as marketing props by the banks producing them. This is because the banks 
putting out the forecasts often will benefit greatly from their clients’ stock performing 
well. (Heinzl, 2013) This study aims to prove that due to these reasons, analyst forecasts 
will become much less accurate during this time and therefore has implications for those 
reliant on this information, as well as the reaction to companies not meeting these 
forecasted values.  
2.3: Forecasts and the Business Cycle 
Another 1995 study titled “Analyst Forecasting Errors and Their Implications for 
Security Analysis” created distributions for the difference between analyst forecasts and 
actual earnings for the corresponding period. They ran a regression to estimate the size of 
forecasting error. They divided their distributions based on business expansion and 
recessions. They found that there was no significant difference between the mean size of 
analyst errors in periods of expansion and recession. They concluded that larger 
forecasting errors “did not emanate from business cycles”. (Brown, 2996) This study did 
look at the difference in the error from expansion to recession but it did not analyze the 
different points in time leading up to both. This is problematic, as analysts should always 
be considering macroeconomic factors in order to produce accurate forecasts. I wanted to 
take this study one step further and look into the size of this error not just compared to an 
expansion but across the three quarters leading up to recessions. Therefore, we could see 
if there was a specific point in time in which the size of the error changed.  
 Overall, the levels of analyst bias has been widely researched and there have been 
countless attempts at modeling the error associated with analysts’ forecasts and these 
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models are useful to an extent. However, there is a gap in the literature analyzing the way 
analysts change their forecasts prior to upcoming recessions. I aim to fill a gap in the 
literature regarding analyst forecast error. While it is very important to try to model this 
error and gauge how much analysts are incorrect by, it is also important to analyze how 
this error changes. This will provide insight into what is driving the level of forecasting 
error, but also the periods when analysts’ forecasts should be relied upon by the public 
and when their data may be less accurate.  
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Chapter 3: Hypotheses 
In my study, I will analyze the average difference between the mean analyst 
forecast for earnings, scaled by stock price, and the actual value of earnings for the same 
time period, also scaled by stock price. If the previous literature is true, I hypothesize an 
increase in this difference. This increase would imply that, on average, analysts forecasts 
are staying high relative to the falling performance of the company due to the slowing of 
the economic climate. This will help take a step back from digging into what makes up 
forecasting error and gain a larger picture of how this error is changing with regard to 
important economic events, such as recessions.  
This leads to the second portion of this study, dissecting the components that 
construct the analysts’ forecasting error to see how those are changing leading up to 
recessions. Similar to the regression performed in the aforementioned study, I will also 
run a regression using mean forecasted earnings and actual earnings. I will run the 
opposite of the regression in the previous study. This is to serve the purpose of providing 
more insight on how the error is actually changing over time as opposed to just analyzing 
the level. If analysts are incorporating the fluctuation in economic performance leading 
up to a recession, I hypothesize that the intercept of this regression would decrease. It 
would decrease because analysts, on average, would be less likely to overestimate the 
firm’s performance since there is a decline of economic activity built into their 
projections. The slope of this regression is more indicative of the correlation between 
forecasted earnings and actual earnings in this time period. If analysts were very good at 
forecasting earnings, this coefficient would be close to one. If the slope moves further 
away from one, either greater or less than, the analysts are getting less correlated with the 
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actual value of earnings. Thus, there is a larger error associated with the forecast with 
respect to the actual value. Further, this regression yields a standard error that is 
indicative of how tightly the data fits around the model. In this regression, a high 
standard error implies that analyst forecasts are not tightly fitted to the model, using 
actual values as an explanatory variable. I also hypothesize that this would increase if the 
analysts were getting less accurate leading up to a recession.  
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Chapter 4: Data and Methodology 
 I found the data utilized in this study through the Wharton Research Data 
Services. I searched all companies in the database that had quarterly data back to 1989. 
The actual data was for each quarter and was gathered by the I/B/E/S database two 
months after the quarter ended. The mean estimate was for the forecasted period ending 
on the corresponding quarter to the average price and was collected by I/B/E/S in the 
same month the quarter ended, before the actual earnings value was released. Each 
company has actual quarterly earnings per share value and a mean analyst forecast 
estimate for quarterly earnings for the three quarters leading up to the 1990 recession, 
2001 recession and 2008 recession. I scaled each value by the associated closing stock 
price at the end of the last month of the quarter. I then merged the data within each 
recessionary period across the four quarters corresponding to each recession I analyzed to 
ensure that the same companies were used in each quarter leading up to each recession. 
However, these companies do change across the recessions.  
 I also created a condensed data set to analyze for increased power. This 
condensed set combined the data based on how many quarters prior to the recession it 
occurs. I analyzed the condensed data set the same way the individual quarterly data was 
analyzed. Appendix A contains the summary statistics for all of the quarterly data as well 
as the condensed data.  
 
 
 
 
Bradford, 10 
 
4.1 Average Difference: 
 First, each quarter was analyzed based on the difference between the mean analyst 
estimate and the actual value that was calculated for each company. I then produced 
summary statistics for each of these differences that also appears in Appendix A. I then 
performed difference in means testing across each of the quarters to see in what way the 
analyst forecast error was changing. The purpose of running this test was to ensure that 
analyst error is not stagnant, as in there is a change in the error from quarter to quarter. It 
was also used to analyze in what direction the difference was moving to see if there were 
any trends leading up to a recession. This is for further testing purposes, as if the betas 
are not changing then there will be no trends to analyze leading up to recession. 
𝑡𝑡 =  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1 −  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�𝑠𝑠. 𝑒𝑒.𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1+  𝑠𝑠. 𝑒𝑒.𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 
 
 The equation above was used to calculate the t-statistic for each change in the 
average difference of analyst error. If the t-statistic is greater than 1.96, we can say with 
95% confidence that the average difference did change from quarter to quarter. The sign 
on this t-statistic is also indicative of the direction in which the average difference 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 The average difference defined as the mean estimate less the actual value for the 
company. The subscript t indicates the current quarter or the quarter before. 
𝑠𝑠. 𝑒𝑒.𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 The standard error of the difference in mean estimate less the actual value for 
each company. Calculated by taking the variance divided by the number of 
observations. 
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changed. If the sign is negative, then the average difference decreased from quarter to 
quarter.  
4.2 Mean Earnings Estimate and Actual Earnings Regression:  
The next step of my analysis was to break down the difference between mean 
forecasted earnings and the actual value by running a regression utilizing this data. I ran a  
regression for each of the twelve quarters I have data for using the equation below.  
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 =  𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + ∈𝐷𝐷 
 
𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 The mean estimate of analyst forecasts of quarterly earnings per share for 
each company, collected one month prior to the end of the quarter. 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 The actual value of each company’s quarterly earnings per share collected 
two months after the end of the quarter.  
 
I did not use any control variables because of the way I collected my data. The 
analysts were polled by I/B/E/S the month before the end of the quarter and this was the 
mean estimate value used. This would control for nearly all external variables, such a 
press releases, as analysts had almost full information regarding the company’s presence 
and performance a month before the companies released their actual earnings. Therefore, 
the same external effects would have the same impact on actual and estimated and would 
be controlled for inherently in the data.  
 In this regression, the interpretation of the coefficients gives us relevant insight 
regarding overall bias in analyst forecasts. The intercept, 𝛽𝛽0, represents the overall bias 
direction that is typically referred to as optimism bias. A positive intercept would indicate 
Bradford, 12 
 
that the consensus by analysts was generally optimistic, while a negative intercept would 
indicate pessimistic bias in an analyst forecast. This intercept represents the average of all 
forecasted values; therefore, this positive intercept indicates that on average analysts 
would be slightly more on the optimistic side. The units of this bias is in percentage of 
stock price.   
The slope coefficient, 𝛽𝛽1, is representative of the correlation between the actual 
value of earnings and the estimated value with respect to the variance of the actual 
values. If 𝛽𝛽1was equal to one, then the covariance of mean estimates and actual values 
would exactly equal the variance of the actual values. All of the observed 𝛽𝛽1 values are 
less than one. This tells us that for every one-unit increase in actual earnings, the 
forecasted earnings would move less than one full unit. This implies that shifts in actual 
values are not represented fully in the forecasted values. However, it is important to 
remember that the data used was scaled by stock price. This has large implicated on the 
level of 𝛽𝛽1, as a linear transformation does not alter covariance and variance in the same 
way. The level of this beta does not have much significance; however, the trends in it will 
provide some insight to how large the discrepancy between forecasted and actual values 
are. The farther away from one 𝛽𝛽1, the large this discrepancy is.  
The residual, ∈𝐷𝐷 is forecasting error. This comes as a result the variation in the 
data not being fully explained by the model. (Hughson, 2018). A key statistic regarding 
analyst error is the standard error of the regression. Stata outputs this value as the Root 
MSE. A small standard error of the regression indicates that the data is very tightly fitted 
around the model. In other words, the overall error is small. However, a large standard 
error indicates that the data is more spread out in regards to the model.  
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The purpose of running these regressions is to dissect the composition of analyst 
forecasting error. I will have values for the directional bias as well as the correlation and 
the standard error of the regression and be able to see if the changes from quarter to 
quarter are statistically significant. One would expect directional bias to trend downward 
leading up to a recession as this represents overall analyst bias in this time period. It also 
will allow for the analysis of trends in these changes leading up to recessions that may be 
indicative of a recession approaching.  
Across each quarter, I performed a difference in beta test to ensure that both slope 
and intercept were changing from quarter to quarter. This was performed very similarly 
to the prior difference in means testing. However, the equation below was what was used 
for testing the change in beta. Again, we will do the same analysis as we did on the 
difference in means testing to see if there are any trends leading up to recessions in these 
changes. The t-score that was yielded was compared to a critical value of 1.96, for 95% 
confidence. 
𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡−1 −  𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡
�𝑠𝑠. 𝑒𝑒.𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡−1+  𝑠𝑠. 𝑒𝑒.𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 
 I also performed this test on the regressions yielded from running the condensed 
data that is explained above.  
𝛽𝛽 Represents either the intercept or slope estimate from the regression for 
each time period analyzed. The subscript t indicates the current quarter or 
the quarter before. 
𝑠𝑠. 𝑒𝑒.𝛽𝛽 The standard error of the estimate for slope or intercept calculated by the 
regression. 
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Chapter 5: Results 
5.1: Analysis of Average Difference 
 Appendix C contains all of the results for both the quarterly differences as well as 
the difference in the condensed data. When analyzing the change in the quarterly 
difference across the three recessions, there are few statistically significant changes. 
There is an increase from the second quarter of 2000 to the third quarter of 2000, as well 
as the third quarter to the fourth quarter of the same year. There also is a statistically 
significant increase in from the third to fourth quarter of 2007. While the statistically 
significant changes across these quarters do not seem to be the same across all of the 
quarters, solely analyzing the directional change does yield some interesting results.  
Across all three of the recessions, we see that in the quarter leading up to the 
recession, the difference increases. This means that on average, the mean estimate and 
actual value are farther away in the times leading up to the recession. This follows what I 
hypothesized regarding this data and the previous research. The main conclusion is that, 
while it is not always statistically significant, the difference between the forecasted value 
and the average value is higher leading up to a recession. 
 This theory holds when looking at the condensed data as well. There are no 
statistically significant changes in the average difference from any of the three quarters 
prior to recessions. It is important to note, however, that the mean difference did grow 
leading up to recessions prior to all three recessions. This would suggest that on average, 
the mean estimate is higher than the actual value and that gap widens leading up to 
recessions. This provides some evidence that analysts forecasts are indeed less accurate 
in the times leading up to the recessions and further is in line with my hypothesis. A 
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deeper look in to this difference is necessary because of the fact the changes are not 
significant. By breaking down the levels that are playing a factor into this difference, we 
hope to statistically prove the hypotheses set forth in the beginning of this study. Further, 
just analyzing the difference in means is not entirely informative about the breakdown of 
this difference. Thus, it is important to dive deeper and utilize the regressions coefficients 
and standard error to look further into this data.  
5.2: Analysis of the Intercept Coefficients 
 After running the regression of forecasted values on the actual values The change 
in the intercept coefficient yielded far more statistically significant changes than the 
average difference. This intercept provides information regarding the average outlook of 
an analyst in this time period. If the intercept is positive, it is indicative of a more positive 
outlook on the economic climate. As discussed in the literature review, previous research 
has indicated that analysts always tend to have a more optimistic outlook. However, if 
analysts were factoring in the potential of a recession occurring into their forecasts, we 
would see a decrease in the intercept coefficient in the quarters leading up to a recession 
and especially in the quarter that the recession actually occurs.  
 When analyzing the data across all three recessions, the only time that we see a 
statistically significant drop is from the third to the fourth quarter of 1989 and from the 
last quarter of 2000 to the first quarter of 2001. However, the growth in GDP plummeted, 
and even went negative, in the same time periods that I am analyzing. This would suggest 
a much larger drop in the overall optimism of the economic climate. However, we do not 
see as large of a drop as we would have expected. The 2001 recession began in the first 
quarter, so it is fitting with my hypothesis regarding analyst forecasts that there would be 
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a drop occurring in this quarter. The main issue presented in the 1989 data point is that it 
is followed by two statistically significant increases in this intercept. This means that 
even though there was a drop, the analysts corrected that and ended up at roughly the 
same level when the recession begins as they were three quarter prior. The quarters 
leading up to the 2008 recession are even more against my hypothesis as they see 
statistically significant increases from the first to second quarter of 2007 and the third to 
the fourth quarter of 2007. The recession occurred in the final quarter of 2007 and 
therefore I would have expected to see a fall in the intercept in this quarter.  
 Across all three recessions, there was an increase in the intercept in each quarter 
prior to the three recessions. This is interesting as it would imply that analysts are 
increasing their general outlook, on average, in the quarter leading up to a recession. Not 
all of these increases were statistically significant, but it still would imply that on average 
there was an increase.  
 Even though the quarterly data is a bit sporadic, the condensed data provided a 
clearer picture. There is more power associated with this data as it is far more data points 
for each segment than just looking at the quarterly data. Each change between periods 
was statistically significant. We did see the increase occurring in the quarter prior to the 
recessions start. However with this data, we did see a statistically significant fall in from 
the third to the second quarter prior to the recession and from the quarter prior to the 
recessions start. The falls are in-line with my proposed hypothesis that analysts would be 
shifting slightly downward leading up to a recession. However, since this increase does 
occur the level of the intercept for the quarter containing the beginning of a recession 
ends up almost exactly equal to the intercept relating to two quarters prior to the 
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recession. This is indicative that while there are some shifts downward, it does not trend 
downward leading up to a recession, and actually sees and increase in the average 
outlook right before the recession. This is an area for potential further research as to why 
this shift upward occurs in every quarter right before the recession begins.  
5.3: Analysis of the Slope Coefficient 
 When analyzing the changes in the slope coefficient, I observed a statistically 
significant change in each quarter. All of the slopes that were observed were less than 
one. This would imply that all of the actual values would have to be scaled down by the 
factor of the slope and then added to the level of optimism, represented by the slope, to 
obtain the forecasted value. A slope coefficient closer to one would indicate a more 
closely correlated data set. However, we do not observe this to be the case. In fact, in the 
quarter before the 1990 and 2001 recessions occurred we see a drop in the slope farther 
away from one. This implies that the value of actual to mean were farther away from 
each other, on average, than in the quarter before. The changes in the slope are sporadic 
but it is important to note that each quarter did observe a statistically significant change 
in the slope coefficient. This would imply that, to some extent, the level of error 
associated with analyst forecasts is shifting over time.  
 When we look to the condensed data for results with more power, we observe that 
the value of the slope fell to 0.108, much farther from one than the 0.557 observed in the 
data that was two quarters prior to the start of the recession. This would follow the trend 
of the 1990 and 2001 recession that the slope coefficient in getting farther away from one 
in the quarter prior to a recession beginning. It does increase from this quarter to the 
quarter that the recession begins, however not in as large of a movement. The movement 
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leaves you at a level much farther away from one than the value observed two quarters 
prior to the recession starting.  
 The analysis of the slope coefficient also shows that there is a spike in value from 
three quarters prior to two quarter prior, when looking at the condensed data. This same 
change only occurred leading up to the 1990 recession. In truth, the slope coefficient 
moves around quite a lot and the main take-away is that there seems to be a fall in the 
coefficient from three quarters prior to two quarters prior to a recession beginning.  
5.4: Analysis of the Standard Error of the Regression 
 Similar to the idea of testing the difference in means, looking at the standard error 
of the regression gives us insight into how large the general mismatch between forecasted 
values and actual values are in the time period analyzed. This standard error is an 
indicator of how closely the data is fit around the model. Therefore, if the forecasted 
valued given by the model for a given actual value is very different then the observed 
forecast value, this number will be very high. On a quarterly basis, we see a fairly 
substantial increase in this value from the quarter prior to the recession to the quarter the 
recession begins. This is the same trend as seen in the condensed data.  
 While there doesn’t seem to be a clear trend in the quarterly data, the condensed 
data follows the same pattern as the difference in means. The largest change occurs from 
three quarters prior to the recession occurring to two quarter prior. This is also when the 
largest change in the difference in means occurs. Therefore, this is further evidence that 
forecasted values are farther away from actual values in the quarter right before the 
recession in comparison to the quarters prior to that.  
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 Also similar to the difference in means observations, there is another jump in 
standard error of the regression in the condensed data from the quarter prior to the 
recession to the quarter in which the recession occurs itself. This, coupled with the 
quarterly data and all data for the difference in means, would give us a clear indication 
that analysts are getting less accurate in the quarter leading up to a recession. There are 
multiple reasons why this is the case and this has large implications for those who rely on 
this data. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Overall, there is no indication that analysts biases have gone away or analysts 
have gotten more accurate in the recent years. There is plenty of evidence that suggests 
that analysts are consistently optimistically biased, even in times of recessions. So much 
so, that they are not altering this optimism bias even though the economy is slowing 
down. Quarterly growth in GDP even plummeted to -1.1% in the first quarter of 2001, 
when we would also expect to see a shift downward in optimism bias as well. However 
this is not the case, and it holds true across all of the recessions that I analyzed. This leads 
to less accurate forecasted results. This is a crucial finding for those who are reliant on 
analyst forecasts. This heightened error means that not only are those who invest based 
on projections going to be effected, but the stock price of companies who are not hitting 
these forecasts will drop more than necessary. If analysts were accurately reducing their 
optimism during these times, then the difference between the forecasted earnings value 
and the actual value of earnings would be smaller than it is currently, on average. This 
could imply that company’s stock prices are taking a larger hit then they should due to 
analyst error.  
6.1: Shortcomings 
There were a number of shortcomings associated with running this study. The 
time constraint made it difficult to look at any other periods except for the one analyzed. 
There are a number of different analyses that could be run looking at longer-term 
forecasts or forecasts put out and different times than right before the end of the quarter. 
There could be a difference in these results if the time horizon for the forecast was 
longer. There also is a potential to analyze the trends across a longer period of time. For 
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example if we looked at the forecasts two years prior to the recessions compared to the 
year leading up to the recession, we would control for some effects that were not 
controlled for in this study and gain more insight to how the forecasts were changing over 
time. 
It is important to note that in the time period analyzed, this larger error may not be 
entirely due to the optimism bias of analysts. While the analysis of the intercepts does 
give us an indication that they are not shifting the overall levels of optimism down 
enough, managers may be manipulating their earnings during this time as well. This 
could also lead to larger forecasting error as analysts would not know in what way 
managers are altering earnings until after the actual value is released. In a study published 
in 2002, researchers utilized the 1990 recession as a case study to see if managers were in 
fact manipulating earnings differently in times during a business cycle. They found that 
GDP growth can fairly accurately predict the direction in which earnings are being 
manipulated. In periods of moderate GDP growth, which typically occur right before and 
right after a recession, mean discretionary accruals were positive. This would indicate 
that earnings were being manipulated upward during these times. (Shih, Lin and Zhi 
Xing, 2002). If this is true across recessionary periods, then this upward earnings 
management would close the gap between optimistic analyst forecasts and actual values 
if analysts were staying at the same level across periods. However, this is not what was 
observed. Therefore, analysts are not staying at the same level and the error is increasing 
due to the fact analysts are not adjusting their levels of bias based on slowed economic 
activity.  
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6.2: Further Study 
 The findings of this research open the doors to further investigation regarding this 
topic. Primarily, there is room for further analysis regarding the time horizon the 
forecasts are projected across. It would be interesting to run this analysis for more than 
just quarterly forecasts. We could run the same analysis yearly forecasts or forecasts done 
earlier to the month ending the quarter. This could provide more insight as to whether 
analysts every shift their level of optimism down before a recession. There also is room 
to compare those forecasts to times of business expansions and the corresponding 
recessions. That way we could see if the same analysts were changing their levels of 
optimism in correspondence with those economic trends. 
 Another area to explore is the change in earning management and how this factors 
into the level of error leading up to recessions. As previously mentioned this is a 
limitation on my study and would be very beneficial to analyze. Other factors such as 
timing of press releases and other news that can affect earnings would also be interesting 
to introduce into my study. Even moreso, other factors that could be analyzed are the 
components of the leading economic indicators. How these indicators are reacting and the 
response in the breakdown of analyst forecasts would be an interesting study to run. 
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Appendix A: Summary Statistics 
Summary Statistics for Adjusted Mean Estimate and Adjusted Actual Values: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics Mean Std. Deviation First Quartile Median Third Quartile
1989 Q3 Adjusted Mean Estimate 2.15% 0.017 0.014 0.021 0.029
1989Q3 Adjusted Actual 0.01 0.112 0.011 0.018 0.026
1989Q4 Adjusted Mean Estimate 0.02 0.030 0.014 0.020 0.030
1989Q4 Adjusted Actual 0.01 0.071 0.012 0.018 0.027
1990Q1 Adjusted Mean Estimate 0.02 0.030 0.012 0.018 0.028
1990Q1 Adjusted Actual 0.00 0.370 0.010 0.016 0.025
1990Q2  Adjusted Mean Estimate 0.02 0.038 0.015 0.021 0.031
1990Q2  Adjusted Actual -0.01 0.283 0.012 0.019 0.029
2000 Q2 Adjusted Mean Estimate 0.01 0.029 0.004 0.013 0.022
2000 Q2 Adjusted Actual 0.01 0.029 0.004 0.013 0.022
2000 Q3 Adjusted Mean Estimate 0.01 0.045 0.004 0.013 0.023
2000 Q3 Adjusted Actual 0.01 0.047 0.004 0.013 0.022
2000 Q4 Adjusted Mean Estimate 0.00 0.063 0.005 0.013 0.020
2000 Q4 Adjusted Actual 0.00 0.078 0.004 0.012 0.019
2001 Q1 Adjusted Mean Estimate -0.01 0.099 0.003 0.010 0.017
2001 Q1 Adjusted Actual -0.01 0.105 0.001 0.010 0.017
2007 Q1 Adjusted Mean Estimate 0.01 0.015 0.007 0.011 0.016
2007 Q1 Adjusted Actual 0.01 0.016 0.007 0.012 0.016
2007 Q2 Adjusted Mean Estimate 0.01 0.018 0.009 0.014 0.019
2007 Q2 Adjusted Actual 0.01 0.022 0.009 0.014 0.019
2007 Q3 Adjusted Mean Estimate 0.01 0.028 0.008 0.014 0.019
2007 Q3 Adjusted Actual 0.01 0.042 0.008 0.014 0.019
2007 Q4 Adjusted Mean Estimate 0.01 0.038 0.009 0.015 0.020
2007 Q4 Adjusted Actual 0.01 0.071 0.008 0.014 0.019
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Condensed Summary Statistics for Adjusted Mean Estimate and Adjusted Actual Values: 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics for Quarterly Difference between Adjusted Mean Estimate and 
Adjusted Actual Value: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics Mean Std. Deviation First Quartile Median Third Quartile
3 Quarters Prior Mean Estimate 0.012 0.023 0.007 0.014 0.021
3 Quarters Prior Actual 0.010 0.057 0.006 0.013 0.020
2 Quarters Prior Mean Estimate 0.012 0.034 0.008 0.015 0.023
2 Quarters Prior Actual 0.010 0.047 0.007 0.015 0.022
1 Quarter Prior Mean Estimate 0.009 0.046 0.008 0.014 0.021
1 Quarter Prior Actual 0.003 0.186 0.007 0.014 0.020
Recession in this Quarter Mean Estimate 0.006 0.069 0.008 0.015 0.021
Recession in this Quarter Actual -0.004 0.157 0.006 0.014 0.020
Summary Statistics For Difference Mean Std. Deviation First Quartile Median Third Quartile
1989 Q3 1.167% 0.108 -0.074% 0.090% 0.525
1989 Q4 0.777 0.049 -0.118 0.066 0.594
1990 Q1 1.653 0.351 -0.099 0.063 0.471
1990 Q2 2.729 0.275 -0.100 0.071 0.484
2000 Q2 0.008 0.012 -0.146 -0.034 0.037
2000 Q3 0.195 0.021 -0.127 -0.022 0.090
2000 Q4 0.433 0.038 -0.093 0.000 0.118
2001 Q1 0.373 0.039 -0.104 0.000 0.193
2007 Q1 0.027 0.006 -0.140 -0.022 0.109
2007 Q2 -0.021 0.006 -0.140 -0.022 0.109
2007 Q3 0.207 0.024 -0.160 -0.034 0.091
2007 Q4 0.558 0.053 -0.159 -0.015 0.200
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Summary Statistics for Condensed Difference between Adjusted Mean Estimate and 
Adjusted Actual Value: 
 
 
 
 
Note: Mean, Median and Quartiles are shown as percentage of stock price 
Note: Highlighted Rows indicate Start of recession 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics Mean Std. Deviation First Quartile Median Third Quartile
3 Quarters Prior Difference 0.281% 0.053 -0.001 0.000 0.001
2 Quarters Prior Difference 0.246 0.030 -0.001 0.000 0.002
1 Quarter Prior Difference 0.627 0.171 -0.001 0.000 0.002
Recession in this Quarter Difference 0.985 0.138 -0.001 0.000 0.003
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Appendix B: Regression Results 
 
Quarterly Regressions: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependant Variable Independent Variable Intercept Slope ROOT MSE R-Squared
Quarter 3 1989 Mean 
Estimate
Quarter 3 1989 Actual 0.021 0.042 0.016 8%
(0.01) (0.01)
Quarter 4 1989 Mean 
Estimate
Quarter 4 1989 Actual 0.017 0.346 0.017 69%
(0.00) (0.01)
Quarter 1 1990 Mean 
Estimate
Quarter 1 1990 Actual 0.019 0.052 0.023 42%
(0.00) (0.00)
Quarter 2 1990 Mean 
Estimate
Quarter 2 1990 Actual 0.022 0.035 0.037 7%
(0.00) (0.00)
Quarter 2 2000 Mean 
Estimate
Quarter 2 2000 Actual 0.001 0.925 0.012 83%
(0.00) (0.01)
Quarter 3 2000 Mean 
Estimate
Quarter 3 2000 Actual 0.003 0.706 0.02 80%
(0.00) (0.01)
Quarter 4 2000 Mean 
Estimate
Quarter 4 2000 Actual 0.003 0.706 0.03 77%
(0.00) (0.01)
Quarter 1 2001 Mean 
Estimate
Quarter 1 2001 Actual 0.001 0.925 0.037 86%
(0.00) (0.01)
Quarter 1 2007 Mean 
Estimate
Quarter 1 2007 Actual 0.001 0.899 0.006 84%
(0.00) (0.01)
Quarter 2 2007 Mean 
Estimate
Quarter 2 2007 Actual 0.006 0.511 0.014 39%
(0.00) (0.02)
Quarter 3 2007 Mean 
Estimate
Quarter 3 2007 Actual 0.006 0.556 0.015 72%
(0.00) (0.01)
Quarter 4 2007 Mean 
Estimate
Quarter 4 2007 Actual 0.009 0.357 0.028 45%
(0.00) (0.01)
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Condensed Regressions: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependant Variable Independent Variable Intercept Slope ROOT MSE R-Squared
3 Quarters Prior Mean Estimate 3 Quarters Prior Actual 0.011 0.155 0.021 15%
(0.00) (0.01)
2 Quarters Prior Mean Estimate 2 Quarters Prior Actual 0.007 0.557 0.021 61%
(0.00) (0.01)
1 Quarter Prior Mean Estimate 1 Quarters Prior Actual 0.009 0.108 0.041 19%
(0.00) (0.00)
Recession in this Quarter Mean 
Estimate
Recession in this Quarter 
Actual
0.007 0.209 0.061 22%
(0.00) (0.01)
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Appendix C: Difference in Means Testing 
 
Difference in Means Each Quarter: 
 
 
 
Condensed: 
 
 
 
 
Note: Highlighted rows indicate the start of a recession 
Note: Bolded t-statistics are significant at 10% level, “*” indicates that it is significant at 
the 5%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Difference In Means 
Testing
Average 
Difference
Difference In 
Means
Combined 
Standard Predicted Sign T-Statistic
1989 Q3 0.012
1989 Q4 0.008 -0.004 0.012 n/a -0.34
1990 Q1 0.017 0.009 0.015 n/a 0.60
1990 Q2 0.027 0.011 0.009 - 1.20
2000 Q2 8.207E-05
2000 Q3 0.002 0.002 0.001 n/a 1.71
2000 Q4 0.004 0.002 0.001 n/a 1.73
2001 Q1 0.004 -0.001 0.001 - -0.61
2007 Q1 2.653E-04
2007 Q2 -2.101E-04 0.000 0.001 n/a -0.63
2007 Q3 0.002 0.002 0.001 n/a 1.55
2007 Q4 0.006 0.004 0.001 - 2.60*
Difference In Mean Testing
Average 
Difference
Difference In 
Means
Combined 
Standard 
Predicted 
Sign T-Statistic Variance
3 Quarters Prior 0.003 0.003
2 Quarters Prior 0.002 0.000 0.001 n/a -0.37 0.001
1 Quarter Prior 0.006 0.004 0.003 n/a 1.41 0.029
Recession in this Quarter 0.010 0.004 0.003 - 1.04 0.019
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Appendix D: Difference in Beta Testing 
 
Intercept: 
 
 
 
Condensed: 
 
 
 
 
Note: Highlighted rows indicate the start of a recession 
Note: Bolded t-statistics are significant at 10% level, “*” indicates that it is significant at 
the 5%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Difference In 
Intercept Intercept
Intercept Std. 
Error
Difference In 
Intercept
Combined 
Standard Predicted Sign T-Statistic
1989 Q3 0.021 5.369E-04
1989 Q4 0.017 5.521E-04 -0.004 0.001 n/a -5.69
1990 Q1 0.019 7.488E-04 0.002 0.001 n/a 2.24
1990 Q2 0.022 1.209E-03 0.003 0.001 - 2.10
2000 Q2 0.001 3.213E-04
2000 Q3 0.003 5.057E-04 0.002 0.001 n/a 3.38
2000 Q4 0.003 7.617E-04 0.001 0.001 n/a 0.58
2001 Q1 0.002 9.304E-04 -0.001 0.001 - -1.07
2007 Q1 0.001 1.816E-04
2007 Q2 0.006 4.124E-04 0.004 4.506E-04 n/a 9.96
2007 Q3 0.006 3.780E-04 3.499E-04 0.001 n/a 0.63
2007 Q4 0.009 7.097E-04 0.003 0.001 - 3.49
Difference In Intercept Intercept
Intercept 
Std. Error
Difference 
In Intercept
Combined 
Standard 
Predicted 
Sign T-Statistic
3 Quarters Prior 0.011 3.346E-04
2 Quarters Prior 0.007 3.384E-04 -0.004 0.000 n/a -8.56
1 Quarter Prior 0.009 6.434E-04 0.002 0.001 n/a 2.51
Recession in this Quarter 0.007 9.564E-04 -0.002 0.001 - -1.87
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Slope: 
 
 
 
Condensed: 
 
 
 
Note: Highlighted rows indicate the start of a recession 
Note: Bolded t-statistics are significant at 10% level, “*” indicates that it is significant at 
the 5%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Difference In 
Slope Slope
Slope Std. 
Error
Difference in 
Slope
Combined 
Standard 
Error Predicted Sign T-Statistic
1989 Q3 0.042 4.786E-03
1989 Q4 0.346 7.625E-03 0.304 0.009 n/a 33.74
1990 Q1 0.052 2.024E-03 -0.294 0.008 n/a -37.21
1990 Q2 0.035 4.280E-03 -0.017 0.005 - -3.66
2000 Q2 0.925 1.050E-02
2000 Q3 0.845 1.064E-02 -0.080 0.015 n/a -5.37
2000 Q4 0.706 9.705E-03 -0.139 0.014 n/a -9.65
2001 Q1 0.868 8.763E-03 0.163 0.013 - 12.44
2007 Q1 0.899 1.005E-02
2007 Q2 0.511 1.628E-02 -0.388 1.913E-02 n/a -20.26
2007 Q3 0.556 8.821E-03 4.440E-02 0.019 n/a 2.40
2007 Q4 0.357 1.001E-02 -0.199 0.013 - -14.91
Difference In Slope Slope
Slope Std. 
Error
Difference 
in Slope
Combined 
Standard 
Error
Predicted 
Sign T-Statistic
3 Quarters Prior 0.155 5.742E-03
2 Quarters Prior 0.557 7.005E-03 0.402 0.009 n/a 44.39
1 Quarter Prior 0.108 3.461E-03 -0.449 0.008 - -57.51
Recession in this Quarter 0.209 6.090E-03 0.101 0.007 - 14.40
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Appendix E: Analyzing Trends in Standard Error of Regressions 
 
All Quarterly Changes: 
 
 
 
Condensed Changes: 
 
 
 
 
Time Period
Regression 
Std. Error Predicted Sign
Percentage 
Change
1989 Q3 0.016
1989 Q4 0.017 n/a 0.014
1990 Q1 0.023 + 0.381
1990 Q2 0.037 + 0.615
2000 Q2 0.012
2000 Q3 0.020 n/a 0.650
2000 Q4 0.030 + 0.517
2001 Q1 0.037 + 0.214
2007 Q1 0.006
2007 Q2 0.014 n/a 1.318
2007 Q3 0.015 + 1.949E-02
2007 Q4 0.028 + 0.914
Time Period
Regression Std. 
Error
Predicted 
Sign
Percentage 
Change
3 Quarters Prior 0.021
2 Quarters Prior 0.021 n/a 0.003
1 Quarter Prior 0.041 + 0.943
Recession in this Quarter 0.061 + 0.486
